Governance Failure and the Administration of Justice in Africa: A Comparative Review of Judicial Capacity across Selected States

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Abstract

The study focuses on reviewing the relationship between governance failure and the capacity of the administration of justice in African states. The objective of the study was to synthesise existing academic writings concerning dominant trends, debates and gaps in the literature related to governance failure and justice administration. The study adopted a qualitative comparative literature review deriving materials from secondary sources, including peer-reviewed journal articles, scholarly published books, and policy reports drawing attention to South Africa, Uganda, Botswana and Nigeria. The method comprehensively applied thematic and comparative evaluation with a directed focus on institutional theory to identify patterns, trends, divergence, convergence, and gaps in existing literature. The literature revealed that judicial capacity, centred around institutional independence, resource adequacy, and law enforcement effectiveness, is critical in a functional role to shape governance outcomes. A weak institutional justice system shows constituent correlation with corruption, declining trust, and political impunity, in contrast to stronger judicial institutions that foster enhanced accountability and regulatory compliance. The review also showed that governance failure is derived from complex interactions of political interference, administrative weakness, and limited access to justice rather than a single isolated factor. The study concluded that weaknesses in the administration of justice eroded independence of the judiciary, led to poor funding and endemic corruption, destabilised the rule of law and promoted governance failure. The study recommended reforms in Africa to retool the judiciary capacity and enable funding from the first line charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund to secure financial autonomy and protect judicial independence from executive interference.

Keywords: Administration of Justice, Comparative governance, Governance Failure, Judicial Capacity, Rule of Law, Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Introduction

Governance in a transitional society faces several challenges. A critical review of literature indicates that governance failure remains a pervasive dilemma in Africa, which has manifested in dimensional postures reflected in political instability, economic mismanagement, and social inequality (Onyejiuwa & Ifaka, 2024;

Mlambo, 2023). A dominant link to the governance failure is the lack of capacity in the administration of justice, which predisposes the judiciary as a central force in enforcing laws, adjudicating in disputes, protecting citizens' rights, and providing and preserving equitable access to constitutionally guided remedies (Fombad & Kibet, 2018; Gloppen et al, 2023). The justice institutions encompassing the judiciary, law enforcement agencies, and regulatory bodies are mainly fraught and constrained by political interference, structural weakness (like centralised command), lack of adequate resources, and inadequate professional training or competence. These combined defects limit institutional effectiveness in enhancing accountability, preserving and protecting human rights, and maintaining state sovereignty, which is embodied and exercised in accordance with the rule of law (Ifaka & Odigie, 2021; Ellett,2016; Khosla & Tushnet, 2022; Hayo & Voigt, 2023).

The significance of examining the relationship between governance failure and the administration of justice capacity rests on the critical impact that affects public trust, economic development and social stability. This significance is reflected in the assumption that governance failure is expressed in a weak justice system that empowers corruption, erodes institutional legitimacy, and preserves socioeconomic inequality, complicating governance as a system and output, exploiting and compromising the state-society frame of interactions, and ensuring citizens' rights are unprotected and abused (Mkhize & Nel-Sanders, 2025, 2026; Marah, 2026.; Chioke, 2026). By synthesising existing academic peer-reviewed articles on judiciary vulnerabilities prone to political interference and resource insufficiency, the role of the rule of law and institutional capacity is portrayed as a systemic barrier to effective governance that can provide insights for how reform directed at strengthening state institutions becomes functional in Africa.

The review scope addresses the intersection of governance failure and administration of justice as a focal lens in understanding Sub-Saharan African institutional systemic crisis, with attention directed at judiciary capacity, constitutional framework, corruption, and law enforcement instruments. The review adopts a combination of comparative and case studies of selected countries in Africa (South Africa, Uganda, Botswana, and Nigeria), while deviating from the norms of economic or electoral processes analysis as a basis for studying the developmental trajectory in Africa. The primary question for this review is to explore why governance failure frequently emerges from a lack of administration of justice capacity, and to examine, as an objective, how judicial incapacity, corruption, political interference, and institutional weakness collectively undermine state effectiveness.

This review paper is organized to examine theoretical perspectives on governance, rule of law and justice capability, exploring a comparative and case study context, highlighting the challenges of how justice institutions interact with expected norms of sustainable accountability, enforce rights and promote socioeconomic equality. A synthesis of empirical review focused on judicial capacity, corruption, political interference, and institutional weakness across Africa. The conclusion finalises the thrust of the review to focus on the reform inherent in positioning African institutions for enhancement.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Governance Failure, Rule of Law and Judicial Capacity

The state of governance in Africa is visibly poor owing to several conditions that weakened the judiciary as the mechanism to restore order and promote justice. From electoral process manipulation and abuse of state resources through elite state capture, the protector of the state has been impaired in defending the will of the state through strict adherence to the rule of law. The literature has obviously linked governance failure to the weak capacity in the administration of justice. The rule of law that holds and treats every person equal before the law and expresses the supremacy of the law over all persons by limiting their ability to act in a discretionary manner against public interest has suffered from a lack of effective compliance. The centrality of the rule of law in providing the framework to enhance and ensure accountability, protect socioeconomic rights and dispute resolution in a fair manner is a missing link in Africa (Kyriacou & Trivin, 2026; Elufisan,2025).

Fombad and Kibet (2018) observed that the judicial administration comprising law enforcement agencies, the court and prison (or correctional centres) in Africa has been privatised and limited citizens' access to justice when interacting with state institutions. This has portrayed the justice system as biased, partial, and too weak as an institutional mechanism to enforce the rule of law and the structural inefficiencies undermining the independence of the justice system act as corrosive impediments. Basson (2023) affirmed that the post-apartheid South African courts serve the interests of the powerful elites and are unresponsive to the challenges faced by the poor. This condition has hindered the administration of justice from becoming transformative while remaining an instrument of oppression and preserving economic and social inequality in South Africa. Advancing the claim of Basson, Basson (2023) and Zitzke (2023) identified the process through which the administration of justice faces severe challenges in South Africa. The strong hold of the executive in the control of resources and determining the allocation of resources for the judiciary to function acts as a structural obstacle to the independence of the judiciary. The political economy of resource allocation compromises the quest for the judiciary to hold the executive accountable, and this increases the possibility of directly contributing to governance failure.

Another concrete example of the identified pattern of governance failure and weak administration of justice in Africa is the Uganda case. Bekoreire et al. (2026) and Mayanja (2019) stressed that anticorruption institutions are surreptitiously manipulated by political influence and resource scarcity, which undermine their viability to deal with justice challenges. Mukasa (2025) and Oryema et al. (2025) buttressed that the judiciary is subject to allocation approved by the executive and even appoints judges to perform justice functions. The allocative and appointing power of the political elites identifies the captive encumbrance of how the administration of justice is imperative to fight corruption and challenge governance failure in Uganda. Public trust is minimal or absent in instances where the judiciary is too weak and constrained by powerful elites that control the political economy of the state. Uganda’s experience affirms the literature claim that the rule of law and judicial capacity are determined by political economy in the context of how state legitimacy and governance performance are measured.

Botswana's position stands in the opposite direction to what is experienced in South Africa, Uganda and Nigeria. Botswana has a strong judicial capacity fit to moderate governance challenges, as is the case in the majority of African countries. A foundational prerequisite for Botswana is its independent judiciary that has the autonomous will to confront political interference in determining fair judgment against corrupt persons and entities while ensuring accountability in governance (Dingake et al., 2020; Omotoye & Holtzhausen, 2026).

Adjolohoun (2023) and Fombad (2020) further expressed that where judicial institutions are strong, independent and can enforce the law appropriately, fairly and equitably, the possibility of compliance with state regulation and adherence to corporate governance promotes a credible link between justice capacity and governance outcome. While Botswana's condition is typified as exemplary in the African context, the country still grapples with constraining limitations below universal standards. Existing judicial fortitude in Botswana indicates improved law enforcement and accountability that is cofounded by the rumination of socioeconomic inequality, and other state political and economic institutions are weak. This condition demonstrates that judicial capacity is a necessary condition for governance improvement, but is not a comprehensive sufficient condition to warrant an effective governance system in Africa.

2.2 Corruption, Judicial Weakness and Administrative Dysfunction

Corruption, which is endemic in Africa, stands as both a driver and a consequence of governance failure. Corruption is linked to the quality of weak judicial capacity. Omigbodun (2022) and Fombad (2020) validate that the institutional character of corruption hampers the quality of judicial and other government functionaries, like the public services and regulatory agencies. Fung (2022) and Budhram and Geldenhuys (2018) recounted that when the independence of the judiciary is politically subverted by entrenched elite interests, accountability is compromised with the intent to preserve chronic governance failure. When governance fails, the elite benefit and public interest suffer. Dingake et al. (2020 pointed out the dangerous paradox inherent in the compromised posture of courts and prosecutors aiding corruption rather than fighting the dreaded monster. Anti-corruption agencies and law enforcement officials engaged in systemic corruption serve to destabilise the effects of the rule of law.

Nigeria is notoriously typified as a legendary case in Africa. Olujobi and Irumekhai (2025) and Udude and Onwe (2023) observed that the courts in Nigeria and law enforcement agencies have become reluctant to apply anti-corruption laws. Nweke and Nwosu (2024) similarly established that the inconsistency in enforcing property rights creates a condition where judgments are unpredictable while citizens' trust in the legal system is in continuous decline. People are therefore unwilling to settle their disputes without the courts that lack the means to provide fairness. When political interference influences corruption and creates resource scarcity for the judiciary to function as a reliable arbiter of disagreements among disputing parties, governance failure becomes the norm. While Nigeria is chronically adapted to the politicalisation of the judiciary, the courts appear as the extension of the executives that control the purse of the state, while in South Africa and Uganda, the state capture project of politically connected elites supports the literature’s position that endemic corruption alters the capacity of the judiciary to confront politically exposed persons with the questions of accountability. Judicial weakening reinforces and empowers corruption to induce governance failure (Fombad, 2018; Zimmermann & Riegner, 2023).

Corrupt investigations and outcomes in scholarly publications provide a mountain of descriptive accounts, but there are visible gaps in empirical studies indicating how corruption within the legal framework in Africa affects governance failures. The poor governance visible in Africa is assumedly correlated with judicial weakness, but does correlation mean causation? More studies with in-depth surveys on comparative and longitudinal research are required to focus on how strengthening the judiciary can promote governance outcomes.

2.3 Political Leadership, Institutional Fragility, and Governance Outcomes The separation of powers remains an effective means to control corruption through efficient functional institutional balance, with the judiciary able to check on the activities of the executives and legislatures that have leverage to patronage politics and use public resources for political expediencies. The monetisation or financialisation of the political process in Africa induces corruption since access to political office is used as a vehicle to advance elite interests against the well-being of society. Political elites use their access to power to determine governance outcomes, including making law enforcement and judicial institutions become agents of corruption (Harvey & Duyne, 2026; Yusuf & Hassan, 2026).

Agbor and Matlala (2025) maintain that extractive political elites create and ignite socioeconomic inequalities through rent mismanagement of natural resources, accelerate elite expropriations and allocate resources to projects without future and sustainable gains to society. The judiciary and law enforcement agencies are inherently weakened to permanently entrench the accumulation by dispossession of state resources and eliminate the possibility of resistance in the near future. The iron law of oligarchy is reinforced through these agency institutions. Efayena and Olele (2024) and Casey and Kenny (2022) concurred that the overcentralisation and concentration of powers within the executive, with appointive power for judicial office holders, makes it difficult for judges to fight against executive power.

The powers of the incumbent executive are even guarded with immunity to prevent criminal persecution at the point where the corrupt activities are framed and executed. This inherently prevents the justice administration from functioning at the point where the impact of corruption is minimal, and funds stolen can be recovered. The accountability mechanism is slower and denies the opportunity to act when suspicions are even noticed. Where accountability is restrained or slowed in criminal investigation, the rule of law related to equality of persons is weakened, and this condition amplifies the security and administrative institutions. These institutions are even controlled by the executive whom they ought to investigate. Fragile or failing states are more prone to be exploited with the protective clause of executive immunity (Arshad, 2026; Geddes, 2026).

Uganda readily explains how judicial incapacity accelerates corruption. The linkage is complicated by political leadership interference with judicial independence and the seemingly arbitrary allocation of resources to fight corruption. Where funds are not adequate, anti-corruptions mechanism easily weakened or broken down completely (Dingake et al., 2020; Omotoye & Holtzhausen, 2026). Corrupt elites who benefit from weakened institutions have various mechanisms at their disposal to fight anti-corruption and prevent justice administration from becoming functional. The state apparatus is even more complicated in a network of patronage systems that historically align elite regime security and state institution weakness (Shen, 2026).

The Nigerian case is depicted in political interference deployed to pressure the judiciary in making compromising judgments that contradict earlier court judgment precedents. Statutory laws that protect the socioeconomic rights of citizens are suspended with technical interpretation, and these conditions reinforce how weak state institutions lose credibility and public trust (Danjuma et al., 2025; Abdulyakeen, 2025). The literature observation placed linkages among political leadership, institutional design and the justice administration as cofounding factors to determine the quality of governance.

Both Uganda and Nigeria showed signs of democratic decline, but Botswana's democratic stability reinforces the country’s effective leadership, balanced by a strong and independent judiciary and promotes governance outcomes. The express separation of powers allowed the independent courts to enforce anticorruption laws and maintain consistency in judicial posture (Dingake et al., 2020; Omotoye & Holtzhausen, 2026). While Botswana's institutional stability and democratic consolidation support independent courts and strong administration of justice, executive allocation of resources to social and economic investment has limited reach to address the challenges of inequality and exclusion in social programmes. The comparative case study signifies a work in progress of Africa's trends and challenges with democratisation, justice administration and governance performance.

2.4 Judicial Administration, Access to Justice, and Socioeconomic Equality The judiciary is an essential institution that is designed to protect the rule of law in every society. It legally provides justice, considering fairness and equity among contending parties. Access to justice is recognised as a fundamental determinant of governance capacity and outcomes. Bilchitz (2020) pinpointed South Africa failing in the face of severe inequality to provide free legal representation and public interest litigation to protect the interests of vulnerable populations. Where justice is presented without a balance, the institution of justice administration acts and reinforces unfairness, promotes deprivation, and preserves socioeconomic inequalities. Ribar (2026), Gochberg(2021) Chuks and Ifaka, (2025) and Honig (2017) observe that the contention and gaps between customary law and common law in Africa over disputes dealing with property rights affect the capacity of the judiciary to contribute towards socioeconomic inequality. Property rights confrontations hang in the balance of how society is structured.

In Uganda, the courts' capacity to resolve property rights disputes is connected to the challenges of fairness and well-being. Anti-corruption can be impaired when people lack the opportunity to protect their rights or fight against injustice meted out to them. A collective of poor people can be economically or socially abused by public officials if public resources are diverted without the capacity for the people to challenge such occurrences. Poverty reinforces the opportunity for public officials to be corrupt and become unconcerned about how the people feel (Dingake et al., 2020; Omotoye & Holtzhausen, 2026). In Nigeria, where the courts become available to the higher bidders, the poor and rural communities are alienated, oppressed and lack access to justice. Judicial remedies are not open to the poor who are intimidated by political interference. Law enforcement agencies are helpless when political officeholders interfere with the judicial process and the outcome of court cases (Kosař & Šipulová, 2023). Botswana's strong judicial capacity ensures that law enforcement and anticorruption institutions are collectively productive and warrant inclusive access. These trajectories manifest in governance stability and performance (Dingake et al., 2020; Omotoye & Holtzhausen, 2026).

Comparative case studies of African States provide divergent insights and reinforce the need to close the gap between South Africa, Uganda and Nigeria's governance failures and weak administration of justice, while Botswana's relative democratic consolidation reinforces governance stability and non-interference in the operations of the justice administration, signifying a developmental trend for Africa to follow. The results are contingent on regime type and institutional types (inclusive or exclusive institutions. In spite of the gaps shown across the two sets of countries, reforms are needed to deal with socioeconomic inequalities across both contexts.

2.5 Synthesis of Patterns, Critical Evaluation and Research Gaps

As noted earlier, two major contexts have been identified in Africa related to the study. These contexts reinforce the emergence of several patterns across the countries being investigated. The patterns show that, firstly, governance failure and weak judicial capacity are correlated. Governance is reflected in the persistence of corruption, political interference and underfunded institutions (Fung, 2022; Dingake et al., 2020; Omotoye & Holtzhausen, 2026).

Secondly, where the administration of the justice system is weak, systematic marginalisation of vulnerable groups or persons lacks access to justice inherently reduces institutional legitimacy and public trust (Bergh et al., 2021).

Thirdly, Political leadership exposed to political interference induces institutional fragility. This unconventional trajectory predisposes governance failure in the face of judiciary dependence and is linked to incapacity to be fair in the delivery of justice (Agbor & Matlala, 2025).

The comparative analysis of South Africa, Uganda, Nigeria and Botswana revealed convergence and divergence distinctions of interactions between political leadership (especially elite behaviour) and judiciary capacity and their impact on governance outcomes. South Africa and Uganda reflected how judicial incapacity (weakness) and political executive interference intensified governance failure. For Nigeria, corruption and political interference collectively constrain judicial independence and limit the administration of justice to reinforce governance failure. The convergence for the three countries is the resource scarcity for the judiciary to function towards delivering justice. Botswana showed a different path with a strong judiciary capacity and an independent judiciary, but governance improved while inequality persisted.

2.6 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework adopted for this study is institutional theory. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, in their classical book, Why Nations Fail, expressed that institutional type (inclusive or extractive) and kind (political and economic) interact to determine how development is induced or constrained. A basic assumption of the institutional theory is its focus on the role of institutions in shaping what kind of development is possible under different contexts. The rule is simple: inclusive institutions allow broad participation, create incentives for equal participation and reduce inequality, while extractive institutions constrain or limit broader participation, which exacerbates inequality and provides elites the opportunity to indulge in state capture behaviour and accumulation by dispossession (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

Drawing on the institutional theory framework of justice administration and governance performance, a core assumption is explicit in providing insights into how political, economic, and legal systems are shaped by norms, laws and behavioural expectations (Ifaka, 2017). The quality and capacity of justice are premised on fairness, equity, and justice that provide stability and legitimacy in public institutions and society. The administration of justice, inherently consisting of rule-making, rule enforcement and rule interpretation (spanning several agencies like the legislature, security apparatus, bureaucracy, prison services and correction centres, and the court), is an essential pillar in determining behaviour (both to constrain and provide incentives) and the functioning of institutions to produce divergent outcomes. The reviewed literature typified the capacity of the administration of justice to constrain political actors as a vital independent function tied to autonomy and resource endowment. Institutional theory provides the appropriate lens to examine the capacity of state institutions, whether weak or strong, in providing justice, which impacts governance outcomes.

Methodologically, institutional theory provides several contexts in which justice administration can determine governance performance, which inherently support the comparative case study approach adopted for the study to examine the divergent outcomes produced in South Africa, Uganda, Nigeria, and Botswana.

3. Methodology

The study essentially deployed a comparative case study qualitative literature review design. It focused on generating materials for the study exclusively from secondary sources to examine the relationship between the capacity of the administration of justice and governance failure pervasive in some selected African states. The secondary materials reviewed were derived from peer-reviewed journal articles, published scholarly books, and working papers. The reviewed literature focused on African states using comparative case four African states (South Africa, Uganda, Nigeria and Botswana) were adopted to underscore the convergent and divergent contexts of institutional capacity and governance outcomes. The selection of secondary sources was derived from relevant methodological rigour and theoretical contribution that align clearly with the analytical framework and empirical grounding on specific case studies related to South Africa, Uganda, Botswana and Nigeria to underscore the interaction and intersection of judicial capacity and governance failure in Africa. The study review is embedded in evaluating the implications of effective judicial performance in shaping governance outcomes across the African continent. The review dissects several critical issues challenging governance in diverse settings and observes the context in which Africa's weak institutions declined.

Thematic synthesis and comparative evaluation were symmetrically deployed as the method of analysis. Through these means, pattern and trend analysis identified recurring concepts (judicial capacity and governance performance were dominant) exhibiting divergent and convergent contexts in the cases examined. The comparative insights strengthen the justification for critical assessments of the institutionalist theoretical assumptions and their impact on governance within the literature. The study methodology comprehensively explores several databases to reveal gaps that suggest further study and alternative quantitative methodologies to be exploited to expand the contribution to knowledge.

In direct response to the research question on how limitations in the administration of justice shape governance failure in Africa, the reviewed literature provides a coherent and empirically grounded answer. Across the thematic discussions and comparative cases, the evidence demonstrates that judicial capacity functions as a core mediating variable between formal governance arrangements and actual governance outcomes. Where courts lack independence, enforcement power, or integrity, governance deficits persist through unchecked corruption, weakened accountability, and declining public confidence in state institutions. Conversely, contexts with relatively stronger judicial systems show greater consistency in rule enforcement and administrative discipline, even when broader political challenges remain. The literature therefore supports the conclusion that governance failure in Africa cannot be adequately explained by political leadership or economic constraints alone, but must be understood through the institutional performance of justice systems. This finding reinforces the analytical value of centring judicial capacity in governance research and confirms the relevance of the research question to ongoing debates on state effectiveness, rule of law, and democratic consolidation in African states.

4. Conclusion and Recommendations

The convergent highlights of the reviewed literature indicated the significance of judicial capacity in determining governance outcomes across some selected countries in Africa. Weaknesses in the administration of justice, which are embedded in eroded independence, poor funding, and endemic corruption, appear as regular features that destabilise the rule of law and promote governance failure (Fombad, 2018). In several regions of Africa, from South Africa's post-apartheid judiciary to Nigeria's judicial ineptitude and the conflicting experiences of Uganda and Botswana, the investigations show a similar pattern of dysfunctional judicial systems constrained by the politicalisation of the judiciary, lack of accountability in governance and declining trust of citizens with rising socio-economic inequalities (Dingake et al., 2020; Omotoye & Holtzhausen, 2026; Mbaku, 2019).

The conclusion of the study portrays significant consequences for policy and institutional reform; several recommendations are therefore suggested.

First, retool the judiciary to become independent from the executive and political influence. This will strengthen governance because strict rules and procedures will apply to control corrupt behaviour and also serve as a means of reshaping the judiciary as an instrument for promoting good governance and transparency in public management. Judiciary reform is required to fix the judiciary before it can begin to hold other government institutions accountable.

Second, in comparing several African countries, evidence indicates that judicial capacity requires funding to address issues relating to investigation, law enforcement, and anticorruption practices required to mitigate governance deficits as seen in Botswana and Uganda. The challenges are complex and operate across the high and low spectrum; reforms therefore should be context-sensitive across Africa. Funding of the judiciary should be drawn from the first line charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund to secure financial autonomy and protect judicial independence from executive interference.

Third, the dynamic and complex nature of institutional weakness in Africa exposed a strong link in political, economic and judicial malfunctioning. The review indicates a systematic rot that is pervasive and endemic but strong enough to displace civic participation in the democratic process and undermine the economic well-being of the population. Civic, citizen, and public participation are necessary to democratise the justice administration's institutional framework. For example, the power to appoint judges should solely reside in the Judicial Service Commission, where legal civic society organisation membership would be mandatory for its composition.

Fourth, African states should establish an integrated justice sector framework that formalises collaboration among police, the Ministry of Justice, the judiciary, correctional services, legal aid council and anti-corruption agencies. The integration of the sector will smooth operations of key players and institutions while removing delays for the justice system.

Fifth, a strengthening of justice administration through a uniform recruitment and training programme would define common standards and protocols for addressing ethical compliance and performance evaluation across institutional personnel. Also, an independent mechanism for periodic assessment and discipline is required to reduce corruption and abuse of office in the sector.

Sixth, there is the need to modernise the justice administrative system to be digitised through the adoption and utilisation of an e-justice administration portal that connects the police, prosecution services, courts, correctional institutions, and relevant ministries. Electronic case management, digital evidence management, integrated offender databases, and real-time information sharing would improve transparency, reduce case backlogs, minimise procedural delays, and strengthen accountability across the justice administration system.

5. Suggestion for Further Studies

Future research should investigate why the judiciary has remained ineffective in becoming a transformative agency of development. What is required to transform the judiciary to be just, fair and bold enough.

A critical evaluation indicates that significant gaps still exist in the literature. Most of the literature on judicial capacity and governance performance is largely qualitative and descriptive. The observation demonstrates limited study in empirical studies on the administration of justice and governance outcomes. Also, longitudinal analysis across large African states is scarce.

Further research is needed to also expand the study in addressing regime type, elite behaviour, and political leadership effectiveness in shaping judicial capacity building, an expansive study focusing on justice administration comprising law-making, enforcement, court trial and prison service to address critical reforms that can reflect governance outcomes. Further study is also required in the role of citizens, group mobilisation, civil society organisations and resistance movements towards state capture to constrain political interference, corruption and judicial weakness.

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APPENDIX

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.406[a]	.164	.156	.46630

a. Predictors: (Constant), PH_Composite, IVS_Composite, Fertilizer_Composite, Tech_Composite

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	16.739	4	4.185	19.246	.000[b]
	Residual	85.018	391	.217		
	Total	101.756	395			

a. Dependent Variable: RP_Composite

b. Predictors: (Constant), PH_Composite, IVS_Composite, Fertilizer_Composite, Tech_Composite

Coefficientsa

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.741	.231		7.522	.000
	Tech Composite	.168	.052	.167	3.251	.001
	IVS Composite	.031	.037	.041	.850	.396
	Fertilizer Composite	.109	.044	.127	2.464	.014
	PH Composite	.220	.054	.216	4.043	.000

a. Dependent Variable: RP_Composite